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Executive Summary 
The Federal Treasurer Wayne Swan wrote in The Monthly in March 2012 that:  
Australia’s fair go is today under threat from a new source. To be blunt, the rising power of 
vested interests is undermining our equality and threatening our democracy.1 
But not all vested interests are private corporations.  
This paper draws attention to two statutory agencies of the Commonwealth Government that have 
an explicit, legislatively-defined functions to lobby and advocate for public policy change – the 
Australian National Preventive Health Agency and the Australian Human Rights Commission. 
These two agencies are effectively taxpayer funded lobbyists, embedded in the public policy process, 
enjoying privileged access to the institutions of government. 
The Australian National Preventative Health Agency (ANPHA) received $57,718,000 in the 2012-13 
Federal Budget to “driv[e] the national capacity for change and innovation around preventive health 
policies and programs.”2 
ANPHA publically advocates and privately lobbies for a wide range of Nanny State restrictions on 
alcohol, tobacco, and unhealthy food.  
The Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) received $23,133,000 in the 2012-13 Federal 
Budget. One of its primary tasks is to “promote an understanding and acceptance … of human rights 
in Australia … undertake research and educational programs” and “develop laws, policies and 
programs”3 for parliament to enact. (Unfortunately, the AHRC does not disclose how much it of its 
budget it directs towards this task.) 
However the human rights that the AHRC chooses to promote and advocate are highly selective, 
favouring certain rights above others. 
As well as being policy lobbyists in their own right, AHRC and ANPHA are central to a pattern of 
relationships between the government and non-government sectors. Taxpayer money is being used 
to lobby for the allocation of more taxpayer money. 
One-third of the submissions to the Preventative Health Taskforce – which established the Australian 
National Preventive Health Agency – were from bodies which received large amounts of taxpayer 
funding. 
                                                          
1
 Wayne Swan, “The 0.01 Per Cent: The Rising Influence of Vested Interests in Australia” The Monthly, March 
2012 
2
 Australian National Preventive Health Agency, “Promoting a Healthy Australia” available at 
http://anpha.gov.au/internet/anpha/publishing.nsf 
3
 Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986, Sect 11, Australian Human Rights Commission, “About the 
Commission” available at http://humanrights.gov.au/about/index.html 
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1.0  Introduction 
On 1 November 2012, the Australian National Preventive Health Agency (ANPHA) released a draft 
report Exploring the Public Interest Case for a Minimum (Floor) Price For Alcohol.4 The report called 
for an increase in taxation on wine, which is taxed according to its price rather than its alcohol 
content. The effect of such a proposal would be a substantial increase in the tax on cheaply priced 
cask wine, raising a $15 four-litre cask up to $40. 
The proposal received national attention. ANPHA is, after all, a statutory agency of the 
Commonwealth government, and this was a major proposal: alcohol pricing, particularly as it relates 
to the wine industry, is a controversial area. 
It was, however, not Commonwealth policy to increase wine taxation when the report was 
published. The purpose of ANPHA’s paper, and the media blitz which accompanied it, was to push 
for this taxation change within the government and advocate it in the public sphere, not to 
implement it. 
ANPHA is a statutory agency with a very specific brief: to research, propose, and promote policies 
which it believes will increase the health of Australians. 
To do so, it writes reports, runs seminars, and – most crucially and most jarringly – lobbies the 
government to implement its preferred policy ideas. That is, ANPHA is a government-funded agency 
with a specific brief to lobby the government for legislative change. 
ANPHA is not the only such institution at the Commonwealth level. The Australian Human Rights 
Commission was founded in 1986 with a similar function: to research and advocate the introduction 
of United Nations human rights treaties into Australian law. 
Australians are concerned about the influence of private sector lobbyists on the political process. But 
the discussion about lobbying and politics has, to date, ignored one of the most significant sources of 
influence upon the policy process; that of bureaucracies, regulators, and government-funded 
institutions. Government departments can pursue selfish or ideological agendas as much as any 
private sector lobbying firm. The difference between private and public lobbyists is that  
a) they are funded wholly or largely by taxpayers and; 
b) they are embedded within the formal institutions of government, guaranteeing access and 
influence. 
This paper provides an introduction to the political context about the rise of these hybrid 
institutions. After the economic reforms of the 1980s, governments have been experimenting with 
alternative models of policy change. Such institutions are likely to become more common in the 
future. 
                                                          
4
 Exploring the Public Interest Case for a Minimum (Floor) Price For Alcohol, Draft Report, Australian National 
Preventive Health Agency, November 2012 
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The paper then explores the public choice theory that explains their perverse consequences. 
Government funded lobbyists link two major strands of public choice thought: that of rent-seeking 
by private agents, and that of bureaucratic incentives. 
Then the paper profiles the two major government lobbyists: the Australian National Preventive 
Health Agency (founded in 2010) and the Australian Human Rights Commission (founded in 1986).  
These are by no means the only government-funded organisations that put pressure on parliaments 
for legislative change. To a large degree, all bureaucracies push an agenda.  
Furthermore, there are many Commonwealth research bodies with superficial similarities to ANPHA 
and AHRC. The Australian Research Council hands out grants for research projects. The National 
Health and Medical Research Council has a similar role, as well as collating medical research data. 
Then there are institutions specifically instituted to make policy recommendations. For instance, the 
Productivity Commission and the Australian Law Reform Commission are policy research bodies. 
Other regulators have research wings; for example, the Australian Communications and Media 
Authority. 
But while all these bodies do research, none of these aforementioned bodies have an active 
advocacy role.  
The Australian National Preventive Health Agency and the Australian Human Rights Commission 
have statutory obligations to promote and advocate legislative change. 
Even if we agree with the messages broadcast by these agencies, or the legislative proposals they 
present, it should be of serious concern that there exists taxpayer funded organisations specifically 
to push policy change from within government. 
This paper has been inspired by an Institute of Economic Affairs Discussion paper, “Sock Puppets: 
How the government lobbies itself and why”, by Christopher Snowdon, released in June 2012.5  
Much of the phenomena that Snowdon identifies in the United Kingdom are easily identifiable in 
Australia – charitable interest groups that have subsumed into the state through bureaucratic 
outsourcing continue to pursue ideological or even partisan agendas. Institute of Public Affairs 
research has repeatedly identified this phenomenon in environmental and charitable bodies.6  
Here we look at one way it manifests itself: through statutory bodies and a cycle of grants where 
taxpayer funded non-government organisations use taxpayer money to advocate greater 
expenditure on programs that it may benefit from. 
Obviously the final say of the legislative agenda rests with parliament. Nonetheless, we need to 
recognise and come to terms with the fact that parliament is being influenced by lobbyists from 
within government itself. 
                                                          
5
 Christopher Snowdon, "Sock Puppets: How the Government Lobbies Itself and Why," in IEA Discussion Paper 
(Institute of Economic Affairs, 2012). 
6
 See, for instance, Asher Judah, “Green groups and the government: A dangerous duopoly”, Institute of Public 
Affairs Occasional Paper, April 2011 
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2.0 Special interests influence public policy 
In Western liberal democracies over the last two decades the boundaries between government and 
non-government sectors have become increasingly vague. That blurring boundary has many 
implications for public policy which have not been fully realised. 
During the twentieth century, government was characterised by executive departments and public 
ownership of infrastructure and utilities. The economic reform movements of the 1980s and 1990s 
undermined that unitary model of government.  
The model that has replaced it is more complex and fragmented.  
Public utilities were privatised and their regulation vested in new government agencies. Bodies 
which retained state ownership were “corporatised” to inject some of the managerial discipline of 
the private sector. Social welfare services have been farmed out to non-government bodies. 
Infrastructure is increasingly built by public private partnerships.  
Even policy development is no longer the sole purview of the traditional public service: much policy 
development has been handed over to private contractors. 
We call this new model the “regulatory state”, in honour of its two central features (independent 
regulatory agencies and regulatory growth) but it describes a broader phenomenon than regulation. 
There has been a fundamental transformation in the structure of government. What was central 
government has been decentralised.  
The fragmentation of institutions and bureaucracies makes contemporary government less a “great 
public utility” – as WK Hancock famously described Australian government in the 1930s – and more 
a network of interests, competing for funds, public attention, and the policy priorities of the 
legislature. These institutions tug back-and-forth on the levers of government. 
There are many democratic and policy consequences of this new model of government.7 
Independent regulatory agencies have been delegated powers by the executive but have little 
formal accountability. With their broad powers of discretion and a regulatory ideology that 
emphasises cooperative regulation rather than black-letter law, these independent bodies are 
uniquely vulnerable to principle-agent problems. They can pursue policy goals not intended by 
parliament.  
We should not conclude from these changes that the state has shrunk. Far from it: the dispersal of 
policy control and formulation has given government as a whole a firmer base on which to regulate 
and intervene. The state, argue the Australian political scientists Stephen Bell and Andrew 
Hindmoor, has not been rolled back.8 The size of government – measured traditionally by tax 
receipts and expenditure - through the “neo-liberal” reform period remained steady or increased. 
                                                          
7
 Chris Berg, The Growth of Australia's Regulatory State  (Melbourne, Australia: Institute of Public Affairs, 
2008). 
8
 Stephen Bell and Andrew Hindmoor, Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of the State in Modern Society  
(New York: Cambridge, 2009). 
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The Institute of Public Affairs has demonstrated that the legislative activity of Australian 
governments has at all levels increased substantially. In 1970, at the start of the reform period, the 
Commonwealth parliament passed 700 pages of legislation per year. In 2011 that figure was above 
7,000 pages. Similar growth is seen in state parliaments as well.9  
There are now 97 separate regulatory agencies, departments, and associated institutions in the 
Commonwealth government.10 The Productivity Commission has estimated that there are more than 
600 regulatory agencies – only a subset of the total number of bureaucratic entities – across 
Australia. 
While it is outside the scope of this investigation, it is important to mention that institution-building 
has occurred outside the national sphere as well. Bodies such as the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development and the International Monetary Fund are transnational policymakers 
and advocates, and can assert substantial influence over domestic policy. 
While regulatory agencies are supposed to be purely technocratic bodies, carefully and 
pragmatically weighing policy evidence outside the corrupting influence of democratic politics, they 
have substantial political leeway to pursue their own agendas.  
In the early 2000s, the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission was widely regarded as 
aggressively publicity-hungry, to the degree that it was making substantial decisions of policy 
through its attempts to undermine the reputation of firms it was investigating. This culminated in 
the 2003 Dawson Inquiry, which recommended that the regulator be forced to adopt its own Code 
of Conduct to govern its use of the media. The ACCC’s media activity quickly dropped after the 
Dawson Inquiry but has crept up again.11 
Of particular importance is the observation that government has grown as much in qualitative as in 
quantitative terms. In recent decades government has expanded its interests. One clear illustration 
of this expansion is that much of the regulatory growth has been in areas previously left unregulated 
– for instance, environmental or health and safety law. Another obvious example is the evolution of 
“public health” regulation from non-coercive information dissemination about the dangers of 
smoking to proposed plain packaging for alcohol containers.  
While the ambitions of governments have increased, they are increasingly constrained. The new 
policy emphasis on regulation instead of spending is largely a consequence of the public’s hostility to 
substantial tax increases. Governments have had to be more innovative to develop interventionist 
policy. Once governments would nationalise industries that they wanted policy control over. Now 
bringing policy areas into the states aegis involves “industry partnerships”, grant and subsidy 
programs, national frameworks and plans, quasi-governmental industry boards, and state-sponsored 
codes of conduct. 
Such policy innovation has had the consequence of breaking down the barrier between state and 
non-state institutions.  
                                                          
9
 Berg, The Growth of Australia's Regulatory State. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Ibid. 
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Organisations that may be “private” can nonetheless draw substantial amounts of their income from 
the public purse. It is no longer clear whether many such bodies ought to be described as 
government or non-government organisations. Social bodies – community organisations, religious 
groups – are increasingly involved in delivering state services, and, through those services, are 
becoming de facto arms of the state.  
One clear illustration of this phenomenon is the evolution of the community-based multicultural 
organisations that sprouted up in the 1970s. The lure of government funding has meant that in 
recent decades those organisations have morphed from community groups to state service 
deliverers. Public funding has diverted the business of representing their communities into 
competing for tenders.  
In 2010 the Productivity Commission found that direct funding of non-profit organisations was 
around $25.5 billion every year.12 
Government funding is not limited to service delivery. Many bodies receive large amounts of 
taxpayer funding through research grants. Research grants can be a powerful tool to pursue already 
identified public policy goals. 
Bodies that receive government funding are less willing to criticise government policy. In some 
cases, they are prevented from doing so by the terms of their grants. 
In 2012, the Queensland Health Department mandated that any organisation receiving more than 50 
per cent funding from the department must not advocate legislative or policy change, going so far as 
to ban them from publishing links on their website to other organisations that do. This new rule has 
been condemned by public health activists as a restriction on freedom of speech. Mike Daube, a 
Professor of Public Health at Curtin University, described the Queensland government’s actions as a 
“descent into the dark ages”. But the lesson should be obvious: organisations that are supported by 
government funding also become integrated into the political and policy structure of government. 
That politicians do not like it when organisations they fund attack them should be no surprise.  
This minor Queensland Health episode illustrates the uncomfortable relationship between the 
regulatory state and civil society it seeks to co-opt. Government is a political beast, and the 
encroachment of government funding and service provision into non-government organisations 
politicises those bodies.  
The many diverse government and semi-government bodies of the regulatory state pursue their own 
goals. Each have their own interests.  
Those interests may not align with the interests of the elected representatives who give the 
government their legitimacy, or, indeed, the interests of the public that the government is there to 
serve. 
The idea of special interests has a prominent place in our modern democratic consciousness.  Many 
people believe that corporate interests lobby governments to systematically skew public policy in 
                                                          
12
 Productivity Commission, Contribution of the Not-for-Profit Sector, (Canberra: Productivity Commission, 
2010). 
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their favour, and that political parties and politicians are beholden to those interests – acting not for 
the public they are supposed to represent, but for the corporations who donate to their campaign. 
This belief has led to much policy change in recent decades. The Commonwealth government’s 
lobbyist register is an attempt to expose potential conflicts of interests. The New South Wales 
government’s changes to electoral funding are another attempt to remove special interests from the 
operation of democracy. 
The vast majority of discussion about special interests in politics concerns corporate interests. That, 
indeed, is the focus of the federal lobbyists register. But there are many other special interests trying 
to influence the direction of public policy for private ends. Unions and non-government 
organisations can be just as involved in lobbying and favour-seeking practices as the business sector. 
And, just as critically, not all interest groups are external to government.  
There are many influences on public policy formation that exist within government itself; many 
bodies funded by taxpayers push policy goals within and without the formal structures of 
government. 
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3.0 Statutory agencies are special interest groups 
The fragmentation in government structure in the last few decades has also seen a fragmentation in 
policy-making. In a traditional, hierarchical model of policy development, policy flows directly from 
the bureaucracy to the relevant minister, and thereafter to the parliament. Departments develop 
and assess competing policy options, and present those policies to a minister for their approval or 
dismissal according to the government’s political goals. Ultimately, it is the minister – an elected 
representative – who makes the final decision about what will be presented to parliament. 
This is an ideal model and, even when governments were structured in clear hierarchical lines, this 
model was unlikely to represent reality. A democracy is a clash of interests. Throughout the 
twentieth century policy formation reflected both the desires of the bureaucracy and the desires of 
the interest groups that parliamentary representatives drew political support from. 
Bureaucracies are as much political tools as dispassionate policy advisors. One minor but particularly 
revealing illustration of this was the episode in early November 2012, when the Commonwealth 
Treasury leaked purported impact of opposition policies on business to the Fairfax press. The Labor 
government asked the Treasury to analyse what it assumed were the opposition’s election 
promises.13 The result was highly misleading. It only accounted for taxation increases, and 
completely excluded the two major policies (the repeal of the mining and carbon taxes) which would 
have lowered business costs. Such political use of the bureaucracy is hardly unprecedented – it is a 
recurring feature when either side of politics is in power – but it demonstrates the incentives that 
bureaucracies have to chase the preferences of their political masters. 
But bureaucracies are not mere agents of the executive. Bureaucracies do not always 
dispassionately assess policy options in a neutral, technocratic manner according to the requests of 
their elected superiors. Bureaucracies have their own policy preferences, and can drive elected 
representatives in certain directions. The classic fictional portrayal of the clash between bureaucratic 
interests and political interests is the Yes, Minister television series. Yes, Minister drew heavily on 
the insights of the public choice school of political economy.  
It is worth briefly outlining the classical public choice perspective on bureaucratic behaviour before 
applying that model to the fragmented regulatory state. 
Public choice theory makes one simple claim: individuals who work in the public sector are as driven 
by self-interest as those who work in the private sector. The basic assumptions of economics –
incentives matter, and individuals seek to maximise their own happiness, or wealth, or leisure – 
apply to actors working in non-market environments too.  
Public choice is a corrective to the implied model of bureaucracy that still dominates popular 
understanding; that is, bureaucracies act solely in the “public interest”, and public servants are 
servants of the public. But there is no reason to believe than an individual, moving from the private 
sector to the public sector, abandons their own desires, can act against their own incentives, and 
                                                          
13
 Ben Packham & Lanai Vasek, “Wayne Swan admits telling Treasury to cost Coalition policies”, The Australian, 
7 November 2012 
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stops being driven by self-interest. Public choice is a way of studying government without the 
romance. If the market is dysfunctional – if it is flawed because of information asymmetries, 
externalities, or irrational actors – then the public sector is just as deeply, if not more deeply, flawed. 
The political economist William Niskanen described bureaus as “nonprofit organizations that are 
financed primarily by a periodic appropriation or grant”.14 Bureaucracies are not passive actors in 
the process of government. Niskanen argued that bureaucracies try to maximise three things: pay, 
power, and prestige. A successful bureaucracy is one that increases its discretionary budget, 
increases its powers, and increases its prominence. The central recognition is that principle-agent 
problems are rife in the public service. It is (often) in the interests of parliament that appropriations 
are minimised, but it is in the interests of the bureaucracy that appropriations are maximised. 
For our purposes, the bureaucracy acts as a special interest embedded within the structure of 
government.  Bureaucracies compete against each other for an increased share of the total 
bureaucratic budget. But that total budget is not fixed, so bureaucracies can cooperate to influence 
the total size: as a unified entity they act as a special interest pressuring legislators to raise taxes or 
reprioritise total government spending. 
Dieter Bös offers a compelling model of bureaucratic lobbying that posits antagonistic competition 
between individual bureaucrats for a share of the budget, but cooperation to grow the pool.15 Bös 
makes a further important point for our purposes here. The currency of bureaucratic lobbyists is 
time, not money. Most discussion of lobbying concerns issues like campaign contributions, as there 
is a popular perception of private sector actors as dominating lobbying. The calculation of a car 
company lobbying for subsidies – where it could justifiably spend on lobbying up to the benefit of 
the subsidy less a reasonable rate of return – does not hold for public sector agents. Bureaucracies 
have no other means by which to “profit” other than lobbying. Public sector lobbying has one 
significant advantage over private sector lobbying: access. Corporations donate to campaigns in 
order to gain access. Bureaucracies, institutionally embedded in the political system, already have 
that access. 
The classical public choice model of bureaucracy was developed in the 1970s; that is, before the 
fragmentation of the regulatory state.  
Some reform to the public service was specifically designed to counter some public choice problems. 
For example, the corporatisation of government enterprises was intended to introduce market 
discipline into formerly non-market service provision. The contracting out of government services 
was supposed to deal with similar problems: a more efficient private sector would be able to 
perform functions cheaper and more effectively than a politicised public sector. But these reforms 
have also exacerbated some more challenging and pervasive problems. 
Bureaus increasingly act as discrete special interests acting within the formal structure of 
government. Independent regulatory agencies lobby legislators as much as traditional bureaucracies 
for more power, money or prominence. But as they are independent entities - disconnected, 
intentionally, from the political chain of delegation and accountability – their requirements are more 
                                                          
14
 William A. Niskanen, Reflections of a Political Economist : Selected Articles on Government Policies and 
Political Processes  (Washington, D.C.: Cato Institute, 2008). 
15
 Dieter Bös, "Contests among Bureaucrats," Public Choice 119(2004). 
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opaque. Individual ministers are less likely to personally gain from the prestige of larger regulatory 
agencies under their portfolios as they might with a department. But on the other side they are less 
able to judge the necessity of increased power or budgets.  
Politicians typically treat the lobbying of an internal body and the lobbying of an external private 
actor differently. Obviously, they are not treated as “lobbyists” in the common sense of the term: 
government departments do not appear as clients on the lobbyist register. (The only exception to 
this is the Victorian Department of Industry, which appears as a client of Executive Counsel 
Australia.16) When formal inquiries are being held into new legislation, they typically appear as the 
final witnesses, long after representatives of civil society have had their say. Even then, policy 
proposals are formulated in consultation with these independent but internal bodies.  
The 2012 parliamentary inquiry into national security reform offers a particularly strong illustration 
of the role of internal lobbying on the political process.  
In July 2012, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Intelligence and Security was presented with a 
discussion paper from the Attorney General’s Department, containing dozens of proposals to reform 
the Commonwealth’s surveillance and national security powers. The paper was vague and lacked 
little supporting detail for its proposals, particularly for its most controversial one: to require 
internet service providers to store internet usage data for up to two years. 
Submissions were called for, received, then closed. Civil society organisations were the first to give 
evidence on the proposals. It was however only until those third parties were finished and the 
committee began to hear the evidence of a range of government bureaucracies that the detail about 
the proposals began to emerge. 
It soon transpired that it was not “national security” that data retention was primarily aimed at; it 
was all regulatory power. It emerged that corporate and competition regulators, the taxation office 
as well as ASIO and the federal and state police departments had been lobbying the Attorney 
General’s Department to increase their power. In committee, it was discovered that the Australian 
Securities and Investments Commission and the Australian Taxation Office had been pushing for 
significantly greater powers. The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission wanted to use 
data retention – presented to the public as a matter of anti-terrorism and child pornography – to 
pursue far less serious offense like petrol price collusion. 
The virtues of data retention are outside the scope of our investigation. But this episode accidentally 
revealed the extent to which government policy proposals are shaped as a result of lobbying from 
within government. The ACCC and ASIC are independent regulators, formally separate from the lines 
of accountability. But as they have close relationships within the government, they are in a position 
to formulate policy at an early stage – indeed, at a far earlier stage than the high-profile external 
lobbyists and advocacy groups that receive the lionshare of negative popular sentiment. 
Not all inter-bureaucratic lobbying is targeted at the outcomes we have identified – prestige, 
discretionary budgets and labour force size. Culture matters as well. Just as private sector actors are 
not rationally-maximising automatons, public sector actors can be driven by a whole range of 
                                                          
16
 Available at http://lobbyists.pmc.gov.au/register/view_agency.cfm?id=160  
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motives. Many – even most – public servants are inspired by a sense of public duty, for instance. We 
should not imagine the public choice model predicts a bureaucratic war of all-against-all. 
Elected governments come and go, but bureaucracies are constant. Most public servants spend the 
majority of their careers in a single agency. The consequences of this constancy and length of 
employment is that bureaucracies develop their own cultures and policy preferences which they 
advocate to governments of all stripes.  
Obviously agencies have an incentive to defend and expand existing programs. But further than that, 
agencies tend to have a “departmental view” on certain policy positions.17 As we have seen in the 
case of data retention, we would expect those preferences to broadly align with policies which 
expand the power, prestige, or maximise the discretionary budget of bureaucracies. Public servants 
would systematically favour policies which increase state power.  
It is only human that public servants are more likely to see government as the solution to social 
problems. Individuals who are reliant on taxpayer funding are likely to favour increased expenditure, 
even in circumstances where they may not directly benefit: it is a rare bureaucrat that wishes to 
reduce the size of government. We can see this systemic bias in voting patterns in the Australian 
Capital Territory, which disproportionately favours the Australian Labor Party and the Australian 
Greens. Peter Saunders has shown that public servants “are less likely to see tax as an important 
election issue, are less likely to agree that high taxes destroy work incentives, and are less likely to 
think that taxes could be reduced by cutting wasteful expenditure.”18  
Even within highly hierarchical bureaucratic structures, public servants have a substantial capacity to 
direct policy towards their own preferences. Ministers tend not to direct the bureaucracy clearly; 
favouring vague instructions to fully enunciated ones.19 The lack of clarity enables bureaucrats to 
nudge policy in their own direction. 
3.1 Statutory agencies lobbying for legislative change 
Historical experience has demonstrated that the policy lobbying of bureaucracies and independent 
regulatory agencies is highly effective and influential. Some scholars see independent regulatory 
agencies as the driving force behind deregulatory movements in the 1980s, particularly in newly 
privatised industries such as telecommunications, energy and water. One writer argues that “a mode 
of regulation emphasizing independence and expertise” is able to “push through deregulation when 
economic and technological change make public oversight no longer necessary”.20 
At first blush, it makes sense for specialist regulators to be at the forefront of legislative change. The 
expertise of an independent regulator lends authority to its policy recommendations. But like 
traditional bureaucracies these bodies too have their own policy preferences. Their incentives are 
not to favour the public interest but their own interests: that is, more funding, more statutory 
powers, more independence, and more prominence in the public eye.  
                                                          
17
 B. Guy Peters, The Politics of Bureaucracy, 5th ed. (London ; New York: Routledge, 2001). 
18
 Peter Saunders, "The Rise of the Opinionators," Policy 22, no. 2 (2006). 
19
 Edward Page and W. I. Jenkins, Policy Bureaucracy : Government with a Cast of Thousands  (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005). 
20
 Giandomenico Majone, Regulating Europe, European Public Policy Series (London ; New York: Routledge, 
1996). p23 
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Nevertheless, independent regulatory agencies are concerned with the administration of existing 
public policy; advocacy for policy change is not their primary focus. The Australian government is 
increasingly establishing institutions that are specifically designed as policy advocates.  
In the next section we shall look at two of these bodies – the Australian National Preventative Health 
Agency and the Australian Human Rights Commission – that are concerned with policy research, 
development and, most importantly, policy advocacy as part of their statutory role. Unlike 
regulatory agencies, the bureaucratic biases behind these forms of institutions are transparent: in 
both cases they were formed with a specific policy direction in mind, and their role is to pursue that. 
The Australian National Preventive Health Agency was established to encourage government to 
intervene in public and preventative health matters, including advocacy of tax increases and 
regulations. The Australian Human Rights Commission was established to manage discrimination and 
human rights complaints and encourage parliament to implement more human rights legislation. 
While both these bodies have the usual incentives to gather extra responsibility and funding, they 
are driven significantly by their ideological perspectives. When we study the actions and advocacy of 
ANPHA and AHRC, we see them urge for all three. 
One final model of taxpayer funded lobbying is that conducted by organisations which receive large 
amounts of government funding. As governments increasingly favour outsourced service delivery to 
non-governmental organisations, groups which were established as policy lobby groups are now 
recipients of significant taxpayer money. Despite receiving public funds, many of these bodies have 
continued to push for legislative change according to their original goals – in other words, the 
government is sponsoring bodies to lobby it.  
Of particular interest here is the self-replicating nature of these taxpayer funded organisations: 
much of what they lobby for is increased government expenditure, which can often benefit those 
organisations. This cycle of grants is pervasive in Australian public policy, as we shall see in Section 
6.0. 
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4.0 Australian National Preventive Health Agency 
4.1 Origins and purpose 
In her Second Reading speech for the  Australian National 
Preventive Health Agency Bill 2010, the then-Minister for 
Health and Aging Nicola Roxon said it would establish “national 
infrastructure to help drive major change in the way we 
behave and how we look after (or don’t look after) our own 
health.” The new agency would “embed preventive health 
thinking and action, permanently, into the future as an 
enduring institution.” 
The Australian National Preventive Health Agency grew out of the Preventative Health Taskforce.  
This Taskforce was a promise of the 2007 election. Announced in June that year, it was part of a 
broader healthcare package to “shift Australia's health focus to preventing lifestyle diseases and 
illnesses”, and included a commitment to commission a study on the economic costs of chronic 
diseases from Treasury. The Taskforce would include focus on incentives for general practitioners to 
practice preventative healthcare.21  
Chronic disease incentives are a serious issue. Medicare struggles to deal with chronic diseases; its 
single payment model means there is a disincentive for general practitioners to perform the long-
term care which is necessary for chronic disease management.22 As a workaround for these issues, 
Medicare has been augmented with a range of complex incentive schemes. 
This proposal was closely tied into the opposition’s proposal for general practitioner health reform 
across the board. Just as GP Super Clinics would reduce the administrative burden on GPs and allied 
health services, a renewed focus on preventative health would reduce the need for those services. 
However, after the 2007 election, the focus of the Preventative Health Taskforce shifted from an 
integrated part of the now-Rudd government’s hospital and general practice policy, to an entirely 
different beast. 
While the Taskforce’s focus was always initially going to be on chronic diseases relating to alcohol, 
tobacco and obesity, only one of the nine members of the taskforce was a general practitioner, Dr 
Christine Connors, and even then her professional focus was indigenous health. There was only one 
representative of industry – Kate Carnell, of the Australian Food and Grocery Council – and no 
representatives of the tobacco or alcohol industries. Both the Taskforce Chair (Professor Rob Moodie 
of the University of Melbourne) and Deputy Chair (Professor Mike Daube of Curtin University of 
Technology) are leading lights in the euphemistically named “tobacco control” movement. 
The Taskforce was formally constituted in April 2008. Its Discussion Paper, “Australia: the Healthiest 
Country by 2020” was released in 2008. Submissions were called for, three “technical” papers were 
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released (dividing the task into tobacco, alcohol, and obesity), and the final report was published in 
September 2009. 
With such an enormous scope, there was a significant response to the discussion paper. There were 
376 separate submissions. They were drawn from private firms, medical bodies, public health lobby 
groups, and peak bodies. 
Submissions and public inquiries are formal mechanisms whereby interest groups and affected 
parties can comment on policy proposals. Policy makers use them to increase their knowledge of the 
issues, and the stakeholders use them to direct policy makers in their preferred direction. 
Nearly one-third of the submissions to the Taskforce inquiry were produced by organisations that 
received all or a substantial amount of their funding from government – a total of 103 separate 
submissions. 
Figure 1: Submissions to the Preventative Health taskforce by government funding 
 
Source: Institute of Public Affairs 
Many government departments placed submissions into the taskforce’s inquiry. The Queensland 
Department of Health argued for the restrictions of junk food advertising.  
The Victorian Health Promotion Foundation (better known as VicHealth) receives the vast majority 
of its income from the Victorian government. VicHealth called for “comprehensive legislation to 
prohibit all forms of marketing and advertising of foods or beverages, other than healthy foods or 
beverages, directed to children”, traffic light style food labelling, junk food taxes, plain packaging for 
cigarettes, and a whole host of other interventions.23 
A large number of organisations funded by government put in submissions. To take a sample: 
 Aquatics and Recreation Victoria, an organisation funded in part with a grant from the 
Victorian government to run VICSWIM, recommended that the Taskforce increase funding 
for Aquatics and Recreation Victoria.24 
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 Dairy Australia, an industry body funded by a compulsory levy on dairy producers and 
matching government research grants, called for extra collaborative work with organisations 
like Dairy Australia.25 
 Quit Victoria, funded in large part by the Victorian Department of Health, called for an 
extensive range of anti-tobacco policies, including plain packaging.26 Quit Victoria supported 
the establishment of a Preventative Health Agency and suggested that the agency could 
“work together” with Quit Victoria, as well as put the Victorian organisation in charge of a 
national Quitline.27 
 The Australian Association for Exercise and Sports Science represents sports and exercise 
scientists and psychologists. It receives grants from the Commonwealth Department of 
Health and Ageing.28 In its submission, the association asked the Taskforce to recommend 
the mass part time employment of its members across government agencies to provide 
strategic advice.29 
One recurrent theme throughout the submissions is the call on extra government funding – 
particularly from organisations that already received government funding. Often those calls would 
be directed towards the submitting organisations themselves. In this way government support for 
lobby groups is self-reinforcing. Government funding is used to lobby for more government funding. 
Nevertheless, after this extensive submission process, more than 23 days of consultations across the 
country from Dubbo to Mt Gambier, the final document largely affirmed the policy 
recommendations of the Discussion Paper. 
The Preventative Health Taskforce report was released in September 2009 and offered 122 policy 
recommendations. Some of these policies included: 
 Making smoking a “classifiable element” in movies and video games, similar to the way the 
classification scheme treats sex and violence. 
 Plain packaging for cigarette packets 
 “Nationally consistent” laws for late night liquor outlets, outlet density and responsible 
serving of alcohol laws 
 A “Healthy Food Compact” between governments, industry and non-government 
organisations to “drive change within the food supply” 
 Increased and simplified food labelling 
 Phase out junk food advertising on television before 9pm either voluntarily or by regulation. 
A very large number of the recommendations were calls on the public purse. The Taskforce wanted 
more taxpayers’ money to go towards: monitoring liquor laws, monitoring drink driving, increasing 
the resources of Quitline, health care for alcohol problems, campaigns to build a national consensus 
on alcohol consultation, to “de-normalise” intoxication, and so on. 
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Then there were a very substantial number of calls for more research, campaigns and advocacy 
programs. 
But the key policy was the establishment of “critical infrastructure” to pursue public health policy. 
The Taskforce proposed a statutory body which would “be independent”, but work closely with 
government and report to parliament through the Minister for Health.30 
The government’s response stated that “The lack of national and local infrastructure working 
cohesively on preventative health has hindered effective action on key chronic diseases and their 
associated risk factors.” The Preventive Health Agency (the spelling has curiously changed from 
“preventative” to “preventive”) “will work across jurisdictions and portfolios to drive the changes 
required to turn the tide on the escalating burden from these conditions.”31 
Of the 122 proposals of the Preventative Health Taskforce, the only major ones to have been 
implemented are the establishment of the Australian National Preventive Health Agency, and the 
introduction of plain packaging for cigarettes. 
4.2 Campaigning for legislative change 
The Australian National Preventive Health Agency Act 2010 established the new institution, a 
statutory authority which reports to the Minister for Health. 
The Australian National Preventative Health Agency calls itself “Promoting a Healthy Australia”. It 
has a policy jurisdiction over healthy lifestyle promotion, “reducing tobacco use”, “minimising the 
harmful drinking of alcohol”, “discouraging substance abuse”, and “reducing the incidence of 
obesity”. 
ANPHA is likely to be a permanent fixture of the Australian policy landscape. The Coalition supported 
the bill in 2010 and there appears to be no political desire on either side of politics to close this new 
body. 
This new agency is a statutory agency of the Commonwealth government, with all the funding, 
institutional support and capacity that implies. In the 2012-13 Federal Budget, ANPHA received 
$57,718,000.  The chief executive of the agency is appointed by the Minister for Health, and the staff 
of the agency is public servants employed according to the Public Service Act. It is responsible to 
parliament through the Minister for Health. 
Yet at the same time the government has repeatedly affirmed the desire of the taskforce that the 
ANPHA should be “independent”.  ANPHA’s explicit purpose is to “drive major change” in public 
health policy. On its own initiative and on instructions from the health minister, it advises and 
recommends policy for local, state, territory and federal governments. It collects statistics and other 
information on preventative health. It has a generous grant budget to hand out for preventative 
health research. It conducts “educational, promotional and community awareness” campaigns. It 
develops national standards and codes of practice. 
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It also acts to disperse government money to researchers and public health organisations. While 
there has only been one funding round of the Preventive Health Research Grants Program, their 
dispersal suggests the direction that future rounds may take. 
The Preventive Health Agency has a research committee and four internal committees on alcohol, 
tobacco, obesity and national evaluation.  One of the most generous grants has been given to a 
member of the agency’s committees. Professor Tanya Chikritzhs, from Curtin University is a member 
of the Expert Committee on Alcohol specialising in “alcohol research”.32 In March 2012 she received 
a grant of $224,792 to investigate “the public health impacts of liquor outlets in Queensland 
communities”.33  
Other grants have gone to external organisations that conduct significant government lobbying. The 
Cancer Council Victoria and the Cancer Institute NSW has been given $348,093 to research and 
develop advertisements promoting health weight. The Cancer Council Victoria (in a partnership with 
the University of Melbourne) has also received $389,640 to investigate international trade laws and 
regulations that “have the potential to undermine public health initiatives” – a clear reference to the 
legal challenges to tobacco plain packaging in Australian courts and international bodies. 
With both these latter grants, the advocacy role of the Preventive Health Agency is clear. The agency 
is not primarily a health research body. Australia has had the National Health and Medical Research 
Council since 1937. While the agency does research, it is research directed towards public policy 
rather than medical research. Rather than assessing the need for policy intervention, it takes that 
need as granted and seeks to design policies to suit. 
ANPHA also has a marketing purpose as well. It runs campaigns – The National Tobacco Campaign, 
which released an iPhone application, MyQuitBuddy; Swap It Don’t Stop It, an anti-junk food 
campaign with extensive print and broadcast advertising; and the National Binge Drinking Strategy, 
which has a substantial marketing wing. 
But first and foremost the Preventative Health Agency is a lobbyist for whom the government is both 
client and target. Goal 1 of the agency is to “promote and guide the development, application, 
integration and review of public, organisation and community-based prevention and health 
promotion policies”. According to the 2011-12 Annual Report, not only did the agency meet with all 
state and territory health ministers, but has had 110 separate “consultations” with government 
officials to push its agenda. This is an extraordinary large number, and suggests that the impact of 
the agency will not be its research grants, or its social marketing campaigns, but its internal lobbying. 
On top of that internal work, the agency also reports that it has had over 200 meetings with non-
government organisations and industry bodies.  
As if to demonstrate how circular the cycle of funding, lobbying and institution building has become, 
the Annual Report lists as one of its major achievements in 2011-12 that it provided expert advice by 
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writing a submission to the House of  Representatives Standing Committee on Health and Ageing 
inquiry into plain packaging. Plain packaging was one of the major recommendations of the 
taskforce that also recommended the agency.  
In other words, the Preventative Health Taskforce recommended both a major public policy and the 
formation of an institution to advocate that public policy. 
The agency is certain to apply a deeply ideological approach to health policy. Preventative health is, 
itself, a controversial field. The Preventative Health Taskforce recommendations were uniformly 
characterised by an interventionist approach – the 122 recommendations included substantial tax 
increases, substantial public expenditure, a large number of new regulations and public campaigns. 
As the IPA argued in its submission, the taskforce: 
a) downplays the positive role individual choices can play in the health sphere,   
b) pays little attention to the rights of individuals to consume legal products of their 
choosing, and for commercial vendors to provide consumers with those legal products, 
c) fails to interrogate the extent to which the management of individual risk should be 
appropriated by the state, 
d) neglects to properly assess the evidence base of its policy prescriptions, and 
e) presents policies that fail to live up to the framework of evidence‐based public policy.34 
The agency was only established in 2010. It has already pushed itself to the forefront of the debate 
over wine taxation. Any push for future Nanny State regulation will be aided by the substantial 
resources the agency has at its command. Given the dispersal of research funding in its first year – 
directed largely at the obstacles to implementing increased restrictions on what we drink, eat and 
consume – it is likely that the establishment of the agency will be a watershed moment. 
The Preventive Health Agency is a classic illustration of the importance of institutions within 
government. It is a taxpayer funded special interest with privileged access to all levels of 
government. 
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5.0 Australian Human Rights Commission 
5.1 Origins and purpose 
The Australian Human Rights Commission, established in 1986, is 
a Commonwealth statutory agency with responsibilities under 
federal human rights and anti-discrimination legislation: the 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975, the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, 
the Disability Discrimination Act 1992 and Age Discrimination Act 
2004. It also has roles under the Fair Work Act 1996 and the 
Native Title Act 1993. A predecessor organisation (titled simply 
the Human Rights Commission) was established 1981. 
Unlike the Australian National Preventive Health Agency, the commission has a wide set of functions 
– it is not merely a statutory lobbyist. It has two primary roles: to handle individual complaints about 
human rights breaches and to ensure Australians “benefit from human rights education, promotion 
and monitoring and compliance activities”. 
To fulfil its first role, the Australian Human Rights Commission has a quasi-judicial function – it runs 
conciliations to resolve complaints about discrimination, harassment or bullying, on the grounds of 
age, disability, sex, race, as determined in anti-discrimination law. In this manner, the commission is 
of the same category as many other state and federal quasi-judicial agencies, for instance, the 
Refugee Review Tribunal, or the Administrative Appeals Tribunal. 
Yet it is in its second role that the commission is more unusual: to educate and promote human 
rights in Australia. These rights are defined by the international human rights legislation which 
Australia is a party to, including the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 
The commission’s promotional material declares that it is interested in “setting and advancing 
national agendas”. 
We have a track record of drawing national attention to pressing human rights issues, raising 
community awareness and encouraging positive action by governments, service providers 
and others.35 
To do this, the commission has an extensive education and advocacy focus. It lobbies for legislative 
change. It produces “independent” research pushing its own agenda. It runs education campaigns to 
promote its preferred model of human rights thought. 
In the 2012-13 Federal Budget, the AHRC was provided with $23,133,000. Unfortunately the AHRC 
does not break down the expenditure between its compliance and advocacy functions. 
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5.2 Campaigning for legislative change 
One clear illustration of the power of a taxpayer-funded statutory agency promoting its own 
legislative agenda is the long campaign to introduce Commonwealth limitations on freedom of 
speech along racial and religious lines. 
The commission and its 1981 predecessor led the advocacy for the introduction of hate speech laws 
in the Racial Discrimination Act. 
It published a report in November 1983, Proposal for Amendments to the Racial Discrimination Act 
to cover Incitement to Racial Hatred and Racial Defamation.36 In that report, the commission urged 
parliament to make “incitement to racial hatred” a crime, and expand defamation to include group 
defamation according to race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin.  
The commission repeated this call in its major 1991 report Racist Violence: Report of the National 
Inquiry into Racist Violence in Australia, arguing that the government should fully accede to the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and remove its reservations that limiting 
discriminatory speech would be a limitation on freedom of speech.37 By doing so, the commission 
exceeded even its own self-written Terms of Reference, which was directed at “acts of violence or 
intimidation based on racism”. Group defamation surely exceeds those limitations. 
The commission was a major participant in the inquiry into the Racial Hatred Act 1995, which 
amended the Racial Discrimination Act to add provisions that made unlawful acts which “offend, 
insult, humiliate and intimidate” on racial or ethnic grounds. When that legislation was passed, it 
was also accompanied by a significant funding increase for the commission itself, to promote 
awareness of the new law and campaign for its acceptance. 
This is one of the most prominent examples of the commission campaigning, but it is hardly the only 
one.   
In June 2012, the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Mick Gooda 
backed a Greens bill to amend Native Title legislation.38 In 2010 he called for constitutional reform.39 
The Age Discrimination Commissioner, Dr Susan Ryan, argued in May 2012 for substantial age 
discrimination reform.40 The commission has been a long-time advocate of increased 
Commonwealth human rights legislation.41 It protested the abolition by the Howard government of 
the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission after the organisation was mired in corruption 
allegations.42 
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In 2010, it contributed 15 submissions to parliamentary and independent inquiries. In 2011 it 
contributed 18, and in 2012 contributed 30. These covered everything from insisting human rights 
be recognised as a core value of the Australian Public Service, to arguing that the National 
Curriculum’s Geography subject “investigate geographical events using an ethical lens.”43 In a 
submission to a parliamentary inquiry into cyber-safety, the commission even argued that in order 
to teach the elderly about online safety, it would be necessary to take out print advertisements – 
elderly people did not use the internet. 
The commission has been explicit about its policy advocacy role and its opposition to government 
policy. In 1996, Sir Ronald Wilson, then President of the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity 
Commission, told a parliamentary committee how his body would respond to the Bringing Them 
Home (stolen children) Report: “it is important within the Human Rights Commission to pursue the 
selling of the recommendations, the monitoring of their implementation, consultation with 
government and other participants in the political process.”44 As Gary Johns wrote in response: “an 
appointed official is suggesting that he will sell the recommendations of the commission, apparently 
regardless of the views of the Government [and] will consult only with the Government as if it is 
somehow above government and will work with other participants in the political process.”45 
In its 26 years of activity, the Australian Human Rights Commission has done an extremely wide 
range of marketing and promotion. It holds events. It gives out awards to individuals, young people, 
legal organisations, businesses, community groups, authors and broadcasters. It sets up committees 
and “ambassadors”, such as the Male Champions of Change group. It runs education campaigns and 
awareness campaigns.   
Like all bureaucracies, one major theme of its policy advocacy is to attract more prestige, funding, 
influence and power.  
This was no clearer than in the AHRC’s submission to the Rudd government’s 2009 National Human 
Rights Consultation.46 Apart from a strong advocacy for an extensive set of new legislatively 
enshrined rights, the AHRC strongly urged the government to increase its financial support of the 
AHRC, along with new powers and an increased prominence in the legislative system. 
Regardless of whether the Commonwealth decided to pass a Human Rights Act, the AHRC wanted to 
be empowered to consider a wider array of “rights”, be given guarantees that parliament would 
respond to its reports, increased power to intervene in court cases, extended jurisdiction over 
private employers, state laws and any other bodies it deemed fit, and be empowered with a formal 
inquiry function, as well as enforceable remedies. 
5.3 An ideologically biased model of “human rights” 
The AHRC is highly selective about what human rights issues it pursues. 
                                                          
43
 Australian Human Rights Commission, Refining the Australian Public Service Values: Submission to the 
Australian Public Service Commission, 2 August 2010;  Australian Human Rights Commission, Strengthening 
human rights  education in the geography: Recommendations on Shape of the Australian Curriculum: 
Geography curriculum, 7 July 2011 
44
 Ronald Wilson, Human Rights Subcommittee of the Joint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence 
and Trade, 20 September 1996 
45
 Gary Johns, “Who's watching the watchdog?” The Australian, 31 July 1997 
46
 Australian Human Rights Commission, Submission to the National Human Rights Consultation, June 2009 
 
February 2013  Institute of Public Affairs 24 
 
One current awareness campaign, Something in Common, encourages visitors to its website to share 
human rights related stories. On the site, human rights issues are grouped into themes – Freedom, 
Respect, Equality, and Belonging. The distinctions made betray a particular ideological approach by 
the sites founders. The Freedom theme describes itself like so: 
We all want to freedom and to be safe from harm. [sic] This means being able to live our 
lives without fear. 
As of November 2012, the four “issues to read and discuss” of the Freedom theme are activism 
against gender violence, bullying and harassment, seeking asylum, and violence against women.  
These are legitimate issues. However, it is not clear that they are the sum total of, or even 
representative of, the challenges to freedom on Australia in the twenty first century. Where is, for 
instance, freedom of speech, freedom to own property, to participate in the political process, or 
freedom to observe a religion? With the exception of the asylum seeker discussion point, the site 
authors appear to have reframed “freedom” as a feeling of security. This however makes it hard to 
distinguish from equity, respect, and belonging.  
An online poll published in February 2013 on the Something in Common website demonstrates 
clearly the absence of these basic human rights in the ideological mindset of the AHRC.  The poll 
asked site visitors “What is THE most important human rights issue for the 2013 federal election?” 
The possible answers included “Treatment of asylum 
seekers”, National Disability Insurance Scheme”, “Closing 
the Gap”, “Equal Marriage”, or “Other”. 
The sole reference on the Something in Common website 
to one of the oldest and most fundamental rights, 
freedom of speech, is only mentioned to justify limits on 
that freedom. In a discussion about the feminist campaign 
Destroy the Joint, the site explains: 
Freedom of speech is a fundamental human right. 
However, internationally and under Australian 
laws there are limits to that right – for example, 
to protect against defamation and vilification. 
Why are these laws limiting free speech 
important? Why does harassment matter? 
Because sometimes abuse isn’t just hurtful, it’s harmful to your health.  
Such reluctance to defend freedom of speech is found throughout the Australian Human Rights 
Commission’s output. A Google search for “freedom of speech” on the humanrights.gov.au site 
returns 413 hits. A search for “vilification” returns nearly twice that: 1,130. Of those mentions of 
freedom of speech, the discussion is always about how that liberty should be limited (“Freedom of 
speech should not trump the right to safety”, “The Racial Hatred Act … Free speech comes at a 
price”, “Extremist Ideology is Not Freedom of Speech”, “Freedom of speech and race hate speech in 
Australia”, “Exercising permissible limits on free speech”.) 
Figure 2: Poll of the week,  
Something in Common, February 2013 
 
Source: http://somethingincommon.gov.au/ 
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In its Intervention in the Federal Court case Clarke v Nationwide News Pty Ltd, which concerned the 
application of Section 18C of the Racial Discrimination Act to a series of user comments on a 
newspaper website, the AHRC explicitly argued for the court to favour anti-discrimination over 
freedom of speech in its interpretation of the law. The exemptions in the Racial Discrimination Act 
that protect freedom of speech should be “construed narrowly … because anti-discrimination 
legislation, as beneficial and remedial legislation, should be given a liberal construction”47 
A further suggestion of the peculiarly political perspective on human rights held by at least some at 
the AHRC appears in a 2009 paper “Freedom of Religion and Belief in a Multicultural Democracy: an 
inherent contradiction or an achievable human right?” co-authored by the then Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner Tom Calma.48 (The paper offers a standard rider 
that the views may not represent those of the commission’s but given that it was written by a 
commissioner and published on its website, it is a good indication of the philosophical perspective 
that characterises the commissions’ view on human rights.) 
In this paper, Calma and his co-author, mount a case for government intervention in private religious 
matters, proposing a role for the state in “moderation of the public sphere”. In religious matters, 
“the hand of government, even if gentle and gloved, may be required to ensure the public good”. 
Freedom of religion – that is, freedom of conscience and the liberty to express that conscience – was 
the first liberty fought for in the modern era.49 Religious liberty is the quintessential “negative” 
liberty, in Isaiah Berlin’s famous model: it requires nothing but the government get out of the way. 
However, the Calma paper suggests that its model of religious liberty is centred on state action. It 
even goes so far as decrying the “persistence” of religious belief in the modern world. 
The Australian Human Rights Commission has a very particular philosophical and ideological 
perspective – one that sees human rights as a matter for government action, not government 
restraint. It speaks more about the progressive concept of “social justice” (8,130 Google hits on its 
website) than it does the liberal and conservative concept of “liberty” (1,260 hits).  
Ideological preferences are fine, of course, but the commission is a heavily resourced government 
agency. 
One influence on the unbalanced approach is the structure of the agency itself. The AHRC is divided 
into six commissioners who direct the policy work of the agency. They are the Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, the Age Discrimination Commissioner, the Disability 
Discrimination Commissioner, the National Children's Commissioner, the Race Discrimination 
Commissioner and the Sex Discrimination Commissioner.  
This is a remarkably unrepresentative of the human rights issues the agency is supposed to promote. 
There is no Freedom of Speech Commissioner, Freedom of Religion Commissioner, Property Rights 
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Commissioner, or Freedom of Association Commissioner, all of which are recognised in international 
human rights law. 
One particularly clear illustration of how one-sided AHRC campaigns are occurred during the debate 
over Gillard government’s 2012 draft exposure of the Human Rights and Anti-Discrimination Act. 
Released in late November 2012, the draft bill was purportedly a simple consolidation of Australian 
discrimination law, but went much further: making it unlawful to “offend [or] insult” on the basis of 
their “political opinion” in any “work-related” environment. The limitations that such a law would 
place on the expression of opinion and freedom of speech are obvious, as the Institute of Public 
Affairs pointed out the day after the draft bill was published.50 
However, in its submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs Committee that was 
inquiring about the draft bill, the AHRC urged the government to go much further. It called for 
political offense to be made unlawful in all areas of public life, and did not raise any issues that the 
draft bill might have had concerning freedom of speech.51 
There is some indication that the attitude of the AHRC has changed in response to the vast public 
outcry around the draft bill. In an opinion column in January, the AHRC president Gillian Triggs 
suggested that “it might be wise to amend the bill, so far as it applies to acts that offend or insult”.52  
While this is a welcome change, it is a disturbing reflection on the values of the AHRC that this clear 
infringement on freedom of speech is only objectionable to the commission if, for political reasons, 
it ends up scuttling the draft bill as a whole. 
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6.0 Taxpayer funded non-government lobbying 
As we have seen, the two statutory agencies discussed in this paper, the Australian National 
Preventive Health Agency and the Australian Human Rights Commission, are also key agencies in the 
relationship between governments and the taxpayer funded non-government sector. 
There exists a large network of publicly funded organisations, researchers and activists who draw 
substantial amounts of money from government in the form of grants. They then use that money to 
advocate their policy preferences, and, just as much, propose increased grant programs for them to 
take advantage of. 
In their 1985 book, Destroying Democracy: How Government Funds Partisan Politics, James T 
Bennett and Thomas J DiLorenzo describe this process as follows: 
a) Politicians allocate taxpayer funds for programs under the guise of alleviating the plight of 
the poor, the sick, the elderly, the unemployed … and serving the "public interest";  
b) The bureaucrats who administer the programs provide taxpayer funds to political advocacy 
groups through grants and contracts ostensibly intended to carry out program objectives;  
c) However, much of the money received by political activists is used to lobby, campaign, and 
organize support for new programs for the bureaucracy to manage, additional funding for 
existing programs, and the (re)election of politicians who favor the appropriations which 
fund the political advocacy. 
d) The political advocacy groups proselytize for their programs to persuade the public through 
the media that greater spending is essential to deal with a pressing social problem; 
sympathetic politicians receive campaign contributions and assistance in their re-election 
efforts; these politicians appropriate more funds for existing programs and initiate new 
programs; the bureaucracy awards more taxpayers' funds to the advocacy groups, and the 
process recycles from step 1.53 
Figure 3: The Grant cycle shows this graphically: the cycle of outsourcing, funding, advocacy and 
further funding which drives grant programs. 
Figure 3: The Grant cycle 
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We can see this phenomenon most vividly in the submissions to the Preventative Health Taskforce, 
where a large number of bodies which already receive government funding used the process to 
advocate more government funding – funding which, no doubt, they would like to be directed at 
them. 
The Australian government runs a wide range of grant programs. Many of these grants are used to 
outsource service delivery, as discussed above. There has been long running criticism that 
organisations that receive government funding for service delivery use that funding to advocate 
policy change, often contrary to the views of the government of the day. 
The extent of such grant programs should not be underestimated. A NSW government audit of 
government grants identified at least 164 grant programs in that state alone. They found that 
approximately 70 per cent of state grant funding was deployed for service delivery.54 
Another major stream of government grants subsidise research. Higher education providers can 
receive research block grants.  Individual academic researchers can apply for competitive grants 
through the Australian Research Council. In the health sphere, the National Health and Medical 
Research Council offers a large number of grants to health researchers. 
More common are individual project grants, administered by a wide array of agencies in order to 
achieve agency goals. We have seen how the Australian National Preventive Health Agency has a 
research grant program focused on behavioural change.  
But many other agencies and departments offer grants. For instance, the Department of 
Immigration offers Living in Harmony project grants to non-government organisations of between 
$5,000 and $50,000 to “promote Australian values”. The Department of Families, Community 
Services and Indigenous Affairs’ Sporting Heroes project distributes $1 million to high-profile 
athletes to deliver positive messages - including those relating to “healthy lifestyle choices”. 
 
6.1 International examples 
Few transformations in governance and political economy have happened in Australia alone.  The 
reforms of the 1980s were experienced, to a greater or lesser degree, almost simultaneously in the 
Western English-speaking democracies. New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States all 
went through a period of reform that saw not only the headline privatisations and tariff reductions, 
but also the expansion of regulatory institutions and public sector reform. 
Accordingly, the problems identified in this report – of government bodies and publicly funded non-
profit organisations pushing policy agendas at taxpayer expense – are present around the world. To 
understand the challenges Australia faces it will be useful to survey how these problems have 
manifested in similar countries. Here we briefly survey the experience of the United Kingdom and 
New Zealand. 
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6.1.1 The United Kingdom 
The contracting out of public services to non-government organisations has been particularly 
significant in the United Kingdom.55 British charities are now predominantly funded by government 
grants. A 2006 study by the Centre for Policy Studies analysed a three year period between the 
financial year 2000-01 and 2003-04 and discovered a massive increase in government reliance. In 
that period, Britain’s large charities increased their fundraising and marketing expenditure by 76 per 
cent. In that time, donations from the general public only increased 7 per cent, but grant money 
increased 38 per cent.56 
There are now 27,000 charities which are dependent on government funding for more than 75 per 
cent of their income. As the British National Council of Voluntary Organisations has argued, there is a 
very real risk “the voluntary sector may be perceived as little more than an agent of the state”. 
Many charities that were founded, and still primarily function, as lobby groups have been caught up 
in this massive wave of government largess. Christopher Snowdon identifies the Pedestrians 
Association (now called Living Streets) as one clear example of an independent lobbyist group that 
now receives more than fifty per cent of its income from government, supported by grants from the 
Department of Health, the Department of Transport, the Scottish government and the National 
Lottery. However, even with this significant increase in government support, Living Streets has 
maintained its ideological and policy preferences; calling for reduced speed limits, year-round British 
Summer Time (which is supposed to lower accident rates by making peak hour travel in lighter 
periods) and even planning restrictions for high street shops.57 
One particularly interesting governance structure in the British context is charities which are set up 
by the government, and funded entirely with taxpayers’ money. For instance, the School Food Trust 
was founded by the Department of Education in response to the Jamie Oliver campaign about school 
food quality; as Snowdon writes, bodies such as this act as “special advisors to the government and 
are essentially part of the bureaucracy”.58 The similarities with the Australian National Preventive 
Health Agency are obvious. Australia’s innovation is to have made these bodies into such large, 
prominent and broad-based institutions with full statutory authority. 
6.1.2 New Zealand 
New Zealand too has a substantial government funded non-profit sector. For example, the Ministry 
of Health and District Health Boards allocates between NZ$2 and $4 billion a year to the non-
government sector for service delivery.  
In 2003 it was revealed that a number of the government contracts with health-related non-
government organisations specifically identified “advocacy” as an output to receive taxpayer 
funding. A wide range of groups, including Action Smoking and Health, Aparangi Tautoko Auahi Kore, 
Smokefree Coalition, Alcohol Healthwatch, Manakau  City Council, & the Obesity Action Coalition 
had activities such as “visit key portfolio MPs and Maori MPs” and “make formal submissions and 
presentations to the select committee considering legislative changes” in their government 
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contracts. As Rodney Hide argued, this was an explicit use of government funds to lobby for 
legislative change.59 
A Ministry of Health review into these contracts found that they violated the NZ civil service 
principle of “political neutrality”, and NZ Treasury’s contract guidelines line include that principle. 
Nonetheless, as David Farrar has pointed out, despite this apparent policy change advocacy 
organisations that receive significant amounts of government funds still appear to deploy this money 
to agitate for policy change.60  Action on Smoking and Health New Zealand receives NZ$578,000 per 
year from the NZ government – 89 per cent of its funding - and runs campaigns for policy changes 
such as plain packaging of cigarettes and tobacco tax increases. This even includes an online petition 
to send mass emails to politicians.  The Public Health Association received $311,967, a large 
percentage of which appears to be deployed for “Advocacy/Healthy Public Policy”. The Smoke-Free 
Coalition also receives substantial government funding - $167,213 – 98 per cent of its total budget. 
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7.0 Conclusion: lobbying and the clash of ideas  
Democracy is a clash of interests and ideas. Non-government bodies are an important input into 
public policy: democracy does not merely constitute elections but it should encourage continuous 
public debate over government action.  
However that clash can be diverted and distorted if government embeds special interests within the 
public policy framework.  
As IPA research has demonstrated in the past, there is nothing necessarily representative about non-
government bodies – they are of civil society but do not represent it.61 
If taxpayer-funded non-government organisations divert the public policy process, then statutory 
agencies undermine it.  
The Australian National Preventive Health Agency and the Australian Human Rights Commission are 
institutionalised lobbyists, embedded within the structure of government, and designed to pursue a 
particular, highly-ideological agenda. 
The ultimate decision-making power for legislation rests with parliament, and these bodies do 
nothing to alter that.  
However, if we are sensitive to the power of private sector lobbyists, we should be even more 
sensitive to the power of publicly funded lobbyists that work within the structures of power rather 
than try to influence it from outside. 
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